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ABSTRACT

Title of Research paper: Research on the Supervision of Chinese Radioactive
Dangerous Goods Maritime Transportation

Degree:

MSC

In nowadays, the application of radioactive substance is increasing more and more.
Because of the radioactive hazards, its transport is a really high risk behavior.
Furthermore, the marine transport of radioactive substance is much danger for the
special weather conditions at sea and a big threat to the oceans. In order to solve these
problems, IMO and MSA departments have carried out a large number of scientific
researches to keep making the marine transport much safer. But the shortcomings of
these researches are obvious that in the radioactive transport field, people usually take
the deterministic analysis methods, which do not separate the serious accident from
the ordinary accident and only analyze the result of the maximum credible accident
(Wang, Tian & Yang, 2005). In such case, people will get misunderstanding on the
risk severity of marine radioactive transport. On the other hand, the traditional analysis
focuses on the radiological safety domain, less concerned on the critical condition,
especially the failure domain. In fact, the process of packaging, stevedoring and
transporting is full of random factors and is easy to slip up which may pose a potential
threat to the safety of the ship, resulting a danger trip full of risks (Feng, 2009).
Recently IAEA has committed to the promotion of the application of PSA. In this
respect, since 1970s the United States had already tried to do risk analysis on
radioactive substances transport when China made the similar research in last ten years
and progressively apply to the analysis of the safety of transport of radioactive
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material (Mao, 2015). Therefore, this paper attempts to discuss if the risk safety of the
vessels under PSA is suitable to China radioactive dangerous goods maritime
transportation. According to the FTA, the accident sequences would be confirmed and
the probability of occurrence of them would be discussed. Due to the very few samples
of data of radioactive transport accident in China, the main content would be focused
on the risk discussion to find out the importance of the accident sequences so as to
reduce the risk. After that, the highly individualized approaches to management and
the suggestion of maritime supervision would be found to ensure the transportation
safety.

Key words: Radioactive Substances, Maritime Transportation, PSA, Supervision,
Countermeasures
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The Background

In March 11, 2011, it was a powerful earthquake which struck the northeastern sea area
of the Japanese island. What is worse, a tsunami was triggered to cover the coast where
is used to be suitable to make the construction of nuclear power plant. Therefore, the
nuclear accident occurred in the 1 to 4 units of Fukushima Daiichi. It is another nuclear
crisis after the Chernobyl nuclear accident (Steinhauser, Brandl & Johnson, 2014).
With the wide application of nuclear technology in engineering, medical and scientific
research fields, the scale and kinds of transportation of the radioactive substances are
rising quickly, showing a rapid upward trend. Nuclear substance is an important kind
of resource as an integral part of modern life that the account of nuclear power
generating capacity is about 16% of the world's total generating capacity (McCay,
Rowe & Whittier et al, 2004). Furthermore, the application of radioactive substance in
the current is very common, when the amount of the transportation of the radioactive
substances by ship is quite large. According to statistics from the International Atomic
Energy Agency, now radioactive substances transportation at sea about 10 million
times every year, 5 percent of which is radioactive material for nuclear fuel cycle and
most of the others are to meet the daily needs of the nuclear matter, such as smoke
alarm and medical cobalt source (Zhang, Wang, Wang & Zhang, 2014). People should
pay attention to the high risk and the complexity of the radioactive substances.
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In recent years, the manufacturing technology of ship design has made a series of
significant progress and got some breakthroughs, which greatly improved the safety
and performance of the structure. However, the improvement in security is not enough.
In order to enhance the safety of the ship, the international maritime industry, the
shipbuilding and shipping department had made a lot of progress by unremitting
efforts, but the marine nature environment remains complex and harsh, which can not
be totally eliminated by the development of the science and technology (Tang & Shan,
2005). What is more, marine traffic accidents and disputes kept happening that IMO
and the IACS put a highly value on them, such as 1992, a Japanese vessel carrying 1.7
tons of plutonium named Akatsuki Mar, was strongly opposed by the states which are
on route, and the Caribbean island states made a declaration of plutonium shipping,
banning all the nuclear materials shipping cargo through the Caribbean, as the
Caribbean became a really nuclear free zone. As the same, 1995, British vessel Pacific
Pintail faced more obstruction from France to Japan carrying radioactive substances.
In November, 1997, vessel MSC Carla carrying nuclear material cesium from France
to American, derived after the storm and the hull was broken into two parts, as 11 tons
of cesium with first half hull sunk to a depth of about 3000 meters under the ocean.
Fortunately, the barrels which filled with cesium did not leak or be damaged. In 1999,
in order to save time, the ship company BNFL forged cargo safety inspection
documents. When these MOX arrived in Japan, the Japanese company refused to
receive these goods and the substances eventually were shipped back to Britain, as a
result, the Britain Company was fined for 60 million dollars (Akten, 2006).

Compare to the situation in China, according to the reports of China National Nuclear
Safety Administration, in recent years, there are only little radioactive accidents and
none of them is serious. Furthermore, radioactive substances are all carried on road
transportation in domestic. Only very few radioactive dangerous goods are transported
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by sea as floating goods (Wang, Yang, Li & Kui, 2010). The supervision of
radioactive dangerous goods maritime transportation is near blank. To reduce the cost
and save the transportation time, some of the nuclear departments are planning to try
maritime transportation about radioactive substances, such as the Dayawan Nuclear
Power Plant in southern China (Huang, He & Chen, 2004). Thus, how to regulate the
maritime transportation of radioactive goods is very important.

1.2 International and Domestic Research Status

With the wide application of nuclear technology, the safety of marine transportation of
radioactive substances has become a big problem in the world. The uncertainty of the
ocean environment leads to the worrying safety of the maritime transport, especially
the radioactive substances which are different to the normal goods. The international
rules restrict its transportation. At present, the main research direction in foreign
countries is the risk analysis of the transportation of radioactive dangerous goods, and
the supervision measures based on the analysis (Fabiano, Currò & Reverberi et al,
2005). For example, after many years spending in analyzing the risk, the United States
Coast Guard supervises marine transportation of radioactive substances through the
coordination mechanism of the government, the professional officer team, the
emergency plan and sophisticated equipment under the rules and regulations (Alan,
2008).

By contrast, in China, the competent authority of radioactive dangerous goods
maritime transportation is the Maritime Safety Administration. But MSA does not
have a department of radioactive risk research. Now, most of the researches of
radioactive goods in domestic are focused on the safety management of the macro
policy. Such as the article ―Radioactive Material Transport Ship Research Proposal‖
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written by Zhou Hailin, it makes a research at the point of shipbuilding industry about
how to build the best vessels to deal with the maritime transport of radioactive material
(Zhou & Tang, 2014). And Li Jian in the article ―Radioactive Material Maritime
Transport‖ represents the weak points of maritime radioactive substances transport
from the shipping procedure, loading condition, packing requirements and the
inspection in the canal and port, and then gives suggestions to improve the radioactive
dangerous goods transport management (Li, 2007).

From the situation of the research, in foreign the main researches mainly focus on risk
analysis and transportation safety, which are intent to balance the profits in the
maritime transportation of radioactive goods under the international rules and
regulations (He, 2010). But in China, it is limited in the suggestions for reducing the
danger because of the too few samples about the maritime transportation of radioactive
danger goods so that there are less scientific supervision plans. Chinese legislation
about radioactive maritime transportation is later than the developed countries, but the
laws and regulations in line with international standards. So the domestic standards
should be more detailed and specific to meet development requirements.

1.3 Brief Summary

Based on the above, not only international shipping business but also the Chinese
maritime department realize that the management of radioactive substance marine
transportation should be considered seriously and doing risk analysis before the
application is necessary. This paper will try to discuss if the management mechanism
suits to analyze the risk of radioactive maritime transport in China, such as PSA,
including the steps of analysis and the data which is needed. After that, it will try to
discuss the best methods in controlling the maritime radioactive substances to
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guarantee the safety.
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Chapter 2 The Definition, Classification and Properties

2.1 The Definition and Classification of Dangerous Goods

Dangerous goods are described as not stable chemical or physical properties.
Moreover, it also includes the following goods: Firstly, the goods are not allowed by
the law or the policy which could cause damage to the ship or the cargo. Secondly, the
goods become dangerous in specific conditions (IMDG Code, 2014). 1924 Hague
Rules and 1968 Visby Rules have the definition indirectly about the dangerous goods
as ―inflammable, explosive or dangerous goods‖. In 1965, Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods was written by the Expert Committee on dangerous
goods transport of the United Nations Economic and Social Council with a purpose to
indicate which goods are dangerous. Their types could be classified based on their
characteristics. There are a large number of forms to define the dangerous goods
(Johan, Wolfram & Anthony, 2006). At the same year, according to Recommendations
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, IMO formulated ―International Maritime
Dangerous

Goods

Code‖

(IMDG

Code).

This

code

completely

cited

―Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods‖ on the classification of
dangerous goods, defined as follows:
(1) Explosives;
(2) Gas, including flammable gases, non flammable non-toxic gases, toxic gases
(3) Flammable liquid;
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(4) Flammable solid, spontaneous combustion and substances meeting water
emitting flammable gases;
(5) Oxidizing substances and organic peroxides;
(6) Toxic and infectious substances;
(7) Radioactive material;
(8) Corrosion products;
(9) Miscellaneous dangerous substances and environmental hazardous
substances (IMDG Code, 2014a).

In addition, in Chapter Ⅶ of SOLAS 74 ―Carriage of dangerous goods‖, the dangerous
goods are classified as,
Class 1 - Explosives;
Class 2 - Compressed, liquefied or pressurized dissolved gas
Class 3 - Flammable liquid;
Class 4 (1) - Flammable solid
Class 4 (2) – Easy flammable solid or substances;
Class 4 (3) – Flammable solids or substances meeting water emitting flammable
gases;
Class 5 (1) - Oxidizing substances;
Class 5 (2) - Organic peroxides;
Class 6 (1) - Toxic substances;
Class 6 (2) - Infectious substances;
Class 7 - Radioactive material;
Class 8 - Corrosion products;
Class 9 - Miscellaneous dangerous substances and environmental hazardous
substances. Compare to the above, it is consistent with IMDG Code (SOLAS 1974,
2012a).
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On the other hand, Annex Ⅲ of MARPOL 73/78 ―Regulations for the Prevention of
Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form‖ points out that
dangerous goods are those marine pollutants which are confirmed in IMDG Code.
Furthermore, Chapter Ⅶ Regulation 7 of IMSBC also tells that solid dangerous goods
are composed of particles or bulk material except the liquid or gas listed in the IMDG
Code, and directly load on the vessel without the need of any intermediate bracing.
These series of conventions are related to the classification and definition of dangerous
goods.

By contrast to the international situation, in Chinese laws and regulations, dangerous
goods is defined as follows: Article 3 in Regulations of Safety Management for
Dangerous Chemicals ―In this regulations, dangerous goods is with the properties of
toxic, corrosive, explosive, flammable, combustion, or with highly hazard to the
human, facilities or environment‖ (RSMDC, 2013); Chapter 3 of Harbor Dangerous
Goods Management Rules ―Dangerous goods is that defined in the National Standard
Dangerous Goods Form (GB-12268, 2012) and IMDG Code, with explosive,
flammable, poisonous, corrosive and other characteristics, transporting in waterway,
port and storage easy to cause personal injury and property damage‖ (HDGMR, 2012).
Article 36 in Rules of Ship Carrying Dangerous Goods Safety Supervision and
Management of the People's Republic of China ―The characteristics of dangerous
goods are explosive, flammable, poisonous, radioactive, contaminative and so on;
When marine transporting, they are easy to cause personal injury, property damage or
environmental pollution‖ (Rules, 2012).

2.2 The Definition and Classification of Radioactive Substance
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2.2.1 The Definition and Classification of Radioactive Substance in Recommendation

In Recommendation, the Radioactivity means that the activity concentration of
radionuclide and total concentration of the consignment more than the specified value
stated in Rule 2.7.2.2.1 - 2.7.2.2.6 (These forms describe all the radioactive elements
and their intensity, in Appendix 1).The classification is based on the activity, the
dispersion, the package and its nature and form (Recommendations, 2013).

2.2.2 The Definition and Classification of Radioactive Substance in IMDG Code

In IMDG CODE, the Class 7 dangerous goods are defined as radioactive substances,
as the radioactive molar concentration is higher than specified value 7.4Bq/kg (0.002
microcurie /g) of any substance (IMDG Code, 2014b).

In Chapter 2.7 of IMDG Code, it represents that ―for Class 7, the type of the packaging
plays a decisive role on the classification‖. But the IMDG Code does not make a clear
classification so that people just make a probable classification in the transportation
practice in accordance with the relevant rules from different stand point, such as the
limit of radioactive material value, the package protection level, the maximum
radiation level of the outer surface which is shown in Table 1. In addition, the
radioactive substances could be divided into many classes based on Transportation
Index and Surface Radiation Level in IMDG Code, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 1 - Classification of Radioactive Substances
Classification

Basis

Category

Subdivision
LSA-Ⅰ

Low Specific
LSA-Ⅱ
Activity (LSA)
LSA-Ⅲ
Surface

SCO-Ⅰ

Contamination
SCO-Ⅱ
Radioactive

Object (SCO)

Intensity and

Fissionable

Hazard Extent

Material

Radioactive
Substance
Low Dispersion
Material
Radioactive
Material in Special
Form
Exempt Type
Package
IP-1
Industrial Package

The Properties of

IP-2
IP-3

the Substances and
Radioactive
Surface

A Type Package

Contamination or

B（U） Type

Radiation Level

Package

Substance Package

B（M） Type
Package
C Type Package
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Source: (Yu & Li, 2012)

Annotations:
(1) Low Specific Activity (LSA) is the radioactive substances with low specific
activity or the average specific activity lower than the limits.
(2) Surface Contamination Object (SCO) is the substances without radioactive but its
surface with radioactive solid.
(3) Radioactive Material in Special Form is the undispersion solid radioactive
substances or seal case full of radioactive substances. Furthermore, the seal case could
not be open until being destroyed.
(4) Low Dispersion Material is the limit dispersion no powder solid radioactive
substances or solid radioactive substance in enclosed containers.

Table 2 - Classification of Package
The maximum radiation
Transport Index (TI)

level of any point of the

Classification

surface
TI=0

Lower than 5μSv/h
Higher than 5μSv/h but

0＜TI＜1

Class Ⅰ – White Sign
Class Ⅱ – Yellow Sign

lower than 0.5mSv/h
Higher than 0.5mSv/h but
1＜TI＜10

Class Ⅲ – Yellow Sign

lower than 2mSv/h
Higher than 2mSv/h but

Class Ⅲ - Exclusive use

lower than 10mSv/h

Yellow Sign

10＜TI
Source: (Yu & Li, 2012)
Annotations:
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Transport Index (TI) is a specific number for the package, outer packing, transport
tank, cargo, no packaging low specific activity Class Ⅰ radioactive substance or Class
Ⅰ surface contamination object, which could be used to control the nuclear criticality
safety and radiation quantity.

2.2.3 The Definition and Classification of Radioactive Substance in SOLAS

In Section D of Article 14 of SOLAS Chapter VII, it points out the radioactive
substances as INF substances, namely according to the IMDG Code in Class 7 which
are the sealed radiation nuclear fuel, plutonium and radioactive waste. Simply the
radioactive substances are classified as three kinds: irradiated nuclear fuel means the
materials which containing the uranium, thorium and / or plutonium isotopes which
has been used to maintain self - sustaining nuclear chain reaction; plutonium refers to
the material that reprocessing extracted from the irradiated nuclear fuel, the synthetic
mixture of isotopes; High - level radioactive waste is the waste liquor which is made
by the refining system in the first stage or the waste made in the radioactive nuclear
reprocessing plant by the subsequent refining phase or the solid transfer by the waste
liquor (SOLAS 1974, 2012b).

2.2.4 The Definition and Classification of Radioactive Substance in Domestic Laws

Radioactive substance is the one which contains radioactive nuclide with its activity
and molar concentration higher than the exemption value prescribed by the state.
Commonly speaking, radioactive substances contain radioactive nuclide and not only
its total radioactivity but also every unit’s radioactivity are higher than the regulatory
limits. At present, the exemption of state provisions is not higher than the basic limit
(the specific limit refers to the Recommendation, the same chart in Appendix 1). If
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the one whose exemption value is lower than the specific value, it is not deemed as a
radioactive substance. Moreover, for easily description, the unit for describing the
level of radioactive value is mSv/h (GB-11806, 2005).

In domestic, Article 1.3 of Regulations of Safety Management of Radioactive Material
Transportation prescribes that according to the characteristics of radioactive
substances and its potential hazards to the human health and environment, the
radioactive substances is divided into three classes (GB-11806, 2005). The first class,
refers to those that would make a significant radioactive impact on human health and
environmental as Class Ⅰ radioactive source, high level radioactive waste, and spent
fuel etc. The second class is about the Class II and III radioactive source, which makes
medium level radioactive impact to human and environment. And the third class is the
Class IV and V radioactive source with low level radioactive waste and chemicals
released into the environment producing small effects. Furthermore, the Radioactive
Materials Classification and Catalogue (March 18, 2010 effective) represents the
classification principles, the specific classification and the directory, which is in line
with the Dangerous Goods Form (GB-12268, 2012).

2.3 The Properties of Radioactive Substance

The atomic nuclear energy of some specific substances will decay and release the ray
which is invisible and only could be detected by the special instruments. This nature is
called radioactivity. Radioactive substance is the material that can radiate energy and
emit ray naturally. Generally, this material is the metal which is of high atomic quality,
like plutonium, uranium etc. Radioactive material has three decay forms of alpha, beta
and gamma, with the emitted ray: alpha ray, beta ray and gamma ray respectively. The
characteristics of the three kinds of rays are different，the harm to the human body and
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the environment is also different (Lenard, 2006).

Alpha ray is a particle flow emitted by radioactive material. It can be emitted by a
variety of radioactive substances. The kinetic energy of Alpha particle could be up to
thousand billion MeV. Because the quality of alpha particle is much larger than the
electron, when passing through the material, it is easy to lose energy by the atomic
ionization. So its ability of penetrating material is much weaker than the beta ray and
easier to be blocked by a thin layer material. Of course, it still has strong ionization.
Usually, human skin or a piece of paper can block it. Therefore, the radiation damage
caused by alpha ray is negligible. But due to the strong ionizing ability of alpha
particle, once it goes in the body (formation of internal irradiation), human organs and
tissues would be in ionization damage and injury concentrated, not easy to restore.
Such as by breathing, eating and other channels, radioactive material is likely to enter
the body (digestive tract or trachea), then alpha rays will be directly acting on the body
tissue, damage to the internal organs of the cell. Therefore, the internal irradiation of
alpha particles is the most harmful, special attention should be paid to prevent the
radiation of the material into the human body. Though it has a short range, the
radiation can be highly concentrated. Special attention must be paid to prevent the
radiation going into the human body (Baidu, 2015).

Beta ray is particle with negative charge in the decay of radioactive isotopes. When in
the air, it has a short range and a weak penetration. The ionization is more powerful
than the gamma ray. Beta ray is the electron flow in high speed motion, which has
strong penetrating ability and weak ionization effect. Since the charge of beta ray is
only half of the alpha ray and its mass is very small, the ionization of the beta ray is
much less than alpha ray. For the quality is light, when passing through the material,
beta ray has a greater penetration and longer range. Therefore, beta ray not only can

14

cause damage to the human body (internal irradiation damage), but also external
irradiation damage if the body is relatively close to the human body (Wang & Yu,
2015). According to the nature of the beta ray, the block can be used to weaken the
strength of the beta ray, such as aluminum or a proper thickness organic glass plate,
etc.

Gamma ray is a high-energy electromagnetic wave, very short wavelength (0.001 0.0001 NM), strong penetrating power, long range, dose uniformity, and high danger.
It is easy to cause DNA breaks in the cells of the organism and cause cell mutation,
blood loss of function, cancer and other diseases. On the other hand, it can also be used
to kill cancer cells for medical purposes. The gamma ray is with no charge that is not
easy to be absorbed by other substances. Therefore, in the three kinds of ray, the
penetration ability of gamma ray is the strongest, which can pass through the 300mm
iron plate. To block or absorb the gamma ray absorption completely is very difficult. In
other words, the radiation is harmful in external irradiation damage. But gamma ray
ionization is the weakest, internal irradiation damage basically does not exist. In order
to weaken the intensity of the gamma rays, the heavy metal is usually used as the
shield (Wang, 2012).

Based on the above, the danger of the radioactive substances is obvious. As a result,
the safety of the maritime radioactive dangerous goods transportation should be put in
the first place.

2.4 Brief Summary

To sum up, this chapter mainly introduces the background, the content and methods of
researching dangerous goods, especially radioactive goods, analyzing the relationship
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among dangerous goods and radioactive dangerous goods. Furthermore, the properties
of radiation may cause many dangers. Because of its particularity, MSA should not
only make efforts on general supervision but also need more detailed requirements.
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Chapter 3 The Problems and Supervisions on Maritime Radioactive Dangerous
Goods

3.1 PSA Mode

To find out the problems in maritime radioactive dangerous goods transportation,
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) may be a good tool. PSA, also known as
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA), is a scientific engineering safety evaluation
technology. Through the reliability evaluation technology (i.e., fault tree analysis), it
could synthetically analyze the various possibilities of the accident in the complex
systems from the key point to the development process (Ma & Yan, 2014).
Additionally, in the analysis, the defects and the failure mode would be found. Finally,
the probability of the risk will be shown. Generally, the analysis process of PSA is
considered as a comprehensive understanding for the risk, which does more accord
with the actual situation, also more in line with the PSA features (Celik, Lavasani &
Wang, 2010). PSA analysis can provide countermeasures for the risk, promote more
recommendations. Therefore, the discussion whether PSA is suitable to the Chinese
radioactive dangerous goods maritime transportation is beneficial.

3.2 PSA Formula

The total risk of the transport of radioactive substances is the total of all the release
sequences of the accident risk, as:
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R=

i Ri

(1)

The simplest expression of risk is the product of sequences and probability. When ―i‖
is for the transport accident release sequence, the risk ―R i ‖ could be expressed as:
R i = A FRi ∗ PRi ∗ (CEi ,q ∗ PEq )

(2)

In formula 2, the first part ―A FRi ∗ PRi ‖ means the probability of release source term
and the second part ― (CEi ,q ∗ PEq )‖ means the consequences of release source term.
A-- The amount of linear transport radioactive substances.
FRi —The released share of the release sequence i.
PRi —The probability of the release sequence i.
CEi ,q —The consequences of source term.
PEq —The probability of specific meteorologic conditions
(Zhao, Zhang, Wang & Tang, 2005)

Thus, the calculation of transportation risk can be divided into the following four parts:
Description of transport program
Confirmation of the release sequence
Evaluation of release sequence
The risk analysis and evaluation

3.3 Description of Transport Program

The first step, a complete description of the transport plan should include the following
contents:
Transport volume
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The starting point and key point of transport
The characteristics of radioactive substances
The methods and forms of transport
The characteristics of the packages and loading of each package
The frequency of transport
The data of the transport route and meteorological conditions
The above information is the basic data for risk assessment
(Chen, 2002).
3.4 To Confirm the Release Sequence – Fault Tree Analysis

The second step of the risk evaluation is to confirm the event sequence which could
cause the release of radioactive substances from the transport package. These events
are called the release sequence. There are a lot of ways to confirm them when in this
paper FTA would be used to ensure the basic events which might cause the release
through the logic relations (Brooke & Paige, 2003). Before the confirmation, the scope
of the analysis should be found. Generally speaking, the scope of risk assessment of
the radioactive dangerous goods could be limited in two situations. One is under the
transportation accident environment, and the other one is any form of destruction of
the container when in normal transport, not including the intentional destruction
(Andrews, 2001).

After the confirmation of the analysis scope, with brainstorm and data statistic, the
safety factors affecting the maritime dangerous goods (including the radioactive
substances) could be divided into five major categories as crew, vessel, navigation
environment, management system and the dangerous goods itself (Lapp, 2005)which
are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 - The safety judgment of marine radioactive substance transportation
Management Level of the
Captain
Crew working Level
Crew Factors
Language Level
Education Level
Average Age
Structure Strength
Equipment Status
Vessel Factors

Vessel Age
Navigation Books and

The Safety Judgment of

Data

Marine Radioactive

Winds

Substance Transportation

Visibility
Environment Factors

Current Speed
Safety Status
Navigational Aids
System Running
Data Completeness

Management Factors
Rationality of Department
Mechanism Validity
Danger Level
Goods Factors

Package Quality
Stowage Quality

Source: (Zhang, Gong, Jiang & Que, 2014)

20

Briefly speaking, the hazards of radioactive substances basically behave in the
environmental pollution and the impact on public health. Its features, firstly, is the
constancy and permanent damaging effects (DMA, 2002). Secondly, the natural
conditions cannot change the radioactivity of radioactive isotope, while people also
can do nothing to make the radioactive isotope lose its radioactivity. The third feature
is the cumulation of the radioactive pollution on environment. Last is the not
perceptibility for the public. Therefore, when analyzing the risk factors, it should
emphasize on the fit, the package, the dosage, the stowage and the insulation (Liao,
2012).

FTA is mainly used to analyze the causes of the accident and evaluate the risk of the
accident, which was introduced to China at the beginning of the 80s of twentieth (Bu,
Wang & Wang, 2007). At present, FTA has become the main method of qualitative and
quantitative prediction and prevention of accidents. The essence of FTA is the
mathematical logic theory, by mapping method (logical diagram) to show what might
be the cause of the accident in figure. In this case, the accident causation would be
found visually and if necessary, the probability of the accident could also be calculated
quantitatively (Xiao & Song, 2009). FTA takes the inverse process to analyze the
accident from cause to result, which is to confirm the result first, making it as the top
event drawing at the top, and then find out the direct cause or the defect events, as the
first layer. Next is to find out the cause of the first layer, which becomes the second
layer. Following this methods to analyze it layer by layer, the most basic event would
be found, as the basic event. Each layer is connected by logical symbols. The whole
analysis process is just like the upside down tree, so that it is named FTA (Li & Jiang,
2005). The connected symbols between each layer are expressed in logic gate, ―And‖
and ―OR‖, when the events are shown by event symbols, such as the top event and the
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defect event in each layer represent with a rectangular. Similarly, the basic event is
circular as the event which is out of further analysis is represented by diamonds. The
logic gate and event symbols are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - FTA Logic Symbol

Source: (Yao, Ren & Li, 2010)
Annotations:
a – Defect event including top event and intermediate event.
b – Basic event or terminal event.
c – Non development event..
d – Symbol ―And‖, which means output event A would occur only when event B1 and
B2 both occur.
e – Symbol ―Or‖, which means output event A would occur whenever event B1 or B2
occur.
f – Symbol ―Conditional And‖, which means output event A would occur only when
event B1 and B2 both occur and meet the condition C.
g – Symbol ―Conditional Or‖, which means output event A would occur whenever
event B1 or B2 occur but still have to meet the condition C.

FTA has four characteristics:
(1) FTA is a logic method with graphical interpretation of the incident under
certain conditions. It works through the layers events to analyze the top event, to find
out the logic relation among the basic events and the top.
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(2) FTA is a flexible method, which could analyze the system accident about the
impact of the human, machine and environment.
(3) Using FTA can deeply study the system process, to discover and solve
problems scientifically.
(4) FTA could analyze the safety of the system from the qualitative and
quantitative analysis, if necessary, also the probability of the accident (Sun & Li,
2008).

Thus, the FTA of maritime radioactive dangerous goods could be drawn as the
discussion,
Top Event:
The maritime radioactive dangerous goods transport accident.
Events:
(1) The faults of crew. It may include the insufficient management ability of the
captain by not being familiar with how to manipulate the vessel carrying radioactive
dangerous goods, or the improper operation of the crews, who do not understand how
to load and unload the radioactive dangerous goods correctly.
(2) The vessel accident. It may include the disrepair and insufficient strength of
the vessel, or aging vessel with old structure, or not equipped with maritime books and
reference data about radioactive dangerous goods (Zhou, Wang & Ding, 2002).
(3) Rugged maritime environment. It may include the severe meteorological
environment, or faulty navigation marks.
(4) The failure management system. It may include the unreasonable organization
causing the rules losing efficacy, or being not familiar with the management of
maritime radioactive dangerous goods transport resulting in ineffective management
mechanism (Zhang, 2012).
(5) Radioactive dangerous goods damage. It may include the unsuitable for
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carrying radioactive dangerous goods of the vessel, or damager package, or radiation
dose beyond the standard, or placed with conflicting goods.

According to the analysis above, the FTA could be drawn as Figure 2.
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Figure 2 - Fault Tree Analysis of Radioactive Dangerous goods Maritime transport

Source: the Author

25

3.5 Evaluation of Release Sequence, Calculation and Evaluation of Risk

To evaluate the release sequence, actually is in order to get each factor of Formula 2.
According to Formula 2, the release probability and the release amount of the
radioactive substances in the accident is needed, as the probability of release source
term. The following data is used for the calculation,
(1) The seal failure data of package in general transport
(2) The seal failure data of container under exogenic action in accident
(3) The data of transportation accident
(4) The characteristics data of radioactive substances in general environment
(Zhang, 2011)
After the steps above, the factors which are needed by Formula 1 and 2 could be found
to calculate the total risk of transportation. Therefore, through the comparison and
sorting of the risk of each release sequence, the countermeasures and the suggestions
are discussed to get the correct method.

3.6 The Shortcomings of the Application of PSA

3.6.1 Only little Analysis on Transport Accident Situation

The analysis of the safety probabilistic of the radioactive substances transport should
focus on the severity of the accident, so as to get the probability distribution of
parameters which represent the severity. That is the basis to carry out the risk
assessment. In the early 80s of twentieth, the United States had already made a great
deal of researches on the severity of the land and maritime transport accident, which
ensure the probability distribution of parameters and provide the basic data (David,
2006). China falls behind in this part because of very little accident analysis, resulting
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in lack of basic data.

3.6.2 No Study about the Analysis of Failure Container

The threshold of the container is an important parameter of failure probability for
safety analysis in radioactive substances transportation. Currently in China, the
radioactive substances transport container basically relies on imports, and
self-developed technology is still lagging behind, which also leads to the lack of the
data of probability analysis.

3.6.3 Incomplete Maritime Transportation Security Database

Recent years, China has initially established the safety database of radioactive
substances transport, including the traffic data on land and at sea of transport routes,
the accident rate and population density data. But the safety probabilistic analysis
needs more function and data to extend the database, such as increasing the data of the
container, the materials and the feedback of the accident experience (Tong , 2007).

3.7 The Problems

From the above analysis, it is known that the risk in maritime radioactive dangerous
goods is still serious. Discussed with the actual situation, the problems could be shown
as followings.

3.7.1 The Legal Problems of Radioactive Pollution Risk Prevention

From the status quo of the prevention of radioactive pollution in China, it could find
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that the relevant laws and regulations are not comprehensive, when it is not systematic
and the legislative system is disordered. It means that the strict structure of law does
not form correctly. The existing law about risk prevention of radioactive pollution in
China is a little out of date, which could not meet the strict requirement of the risk
prevention for radioactive pollution in new era. Although there is a law named
―Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control‖ which is implemented in 2003, but its
legislative background is to deal with the risk of radioactive contamination prevention,
ensure the use of nuclear safety and power generation in the early time. Compared to
the current technology and requirements, there are large changes. The relevant
specifications are not suitable and lack operability (Zhang, Zhao, Wang & Tang,
2003).

3.7.2 Low Potency Level of the Normative Document

At present, the normative documents about prevention of radioactive substances
pollution are very few, many of which are local regulations, department rules, local
standards or suggestions. They are not laws which do not have the legal effect. Their
legislative level is too low and lacks of authority and execution.

3.7.3 Imperfect Legal System of Risk Prevention

The existing legal system contents of the risk prevention of radioactive pollution are
generally not imperfect, lacking supporting regulations and measures, which leads to
the poor operability. Legal norms should be guiding, predicting, educating and
judgmental. The legislation should be clear and specific, with maneuverability
(Miroslav, 2004), but China's legal provisions on prevention of radioactive pollution
risk mostly stipulated in principle. The relevant rules, such as ―Regulations for the
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Safety and Protection of Radioactive Isotopes and Ray Devices‖, just set the
application of the radioactive substances without the procedure and the management
of using radioactive substances. It is far from enough.

3.7.4 The Problems in Maritime Radioactive Substances Transportation

(1) No Compliance. Some vessels are not clear about whether their document of
compliance is including the Class 7 radioactive substances. When there is no
compliance, it is forbidden to load radioactive substances, because it is very dangerous
to carry these kinds of goods.

(2) Not Meeting the Packing Requirements. Because of the potential hazard of
radioactive material, the safety of transportation mainly depends on the transportation
container of its containment, shielding, cooling and preventing the critical
performance. If the packing does not meet the requirements, it could easily lead to the
leakage accident.

(3) No Dose Certification. According to 7.1.14.5, Chapter 2 of IMDG, in normal
transport conditions, the radiation level of any point outside the vehicle could not
exceed 2 mSv/h, and the radiation level which is 2 m away from the surface shall not
exceed 0.1mSv/h. Therefore, when declaring dangerous radioactive material transport,
ship or agent must provide dose on the Class 7 dangerous goods making sure the
radiation level comply with the regulations (Yu, Wang, Lu & Zhang, 2014).

(4) Incorrect Stowage and Segregation. The maritime transport of radioactive
material must meet the specified requirements of stowage and segregation. The
stowage of radioactive material is required, and must separate from other dangerous
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goods. If they are put together, the occurrence of combustion or explosion will damage
the radioactive packaging, which leads to the rupture of the containers losing the
shielding effects of X ray (Yu & Li, 2012).

(5) Ignoring Obligations and Responsibilities. Shippers are generally experienced
units who are professional to produce, sell and use the radioactive material. They are
good at nuclear and radiation knowledge. Due to the complexity and the dangers of the
transportation of radioactive material, the carriers in some cases may find it difficult to
cope with the problems. So, if the shippers do not take their own obligations and
responsibilities in the transport of radioactive material, or try to make the radioactive
goods to be transported as ordinary goods, it will lead to the big disaster.

3.8 The Brief Summary

To sum up, through the introduction of the PSA method and the fault tree analysis of
the marine transportation of radioactive material, it discusses whether PSA is
appropriate in the radioactive material transportation in China. As described above,
PSA analysis needs the support of a large number of data, including failure data of
cargo package and its seal under the long term normal transport, failure data of the
containers, the data of radioactive material characteristics and so on. There is no
long-term detection and collection of the above data in China, so PSA is not suitable
for the risk analysis of marine radioactive material transportation in domestic. Next,
this paper will do more descriptions of the transport of radioactive material in the legal
problems and maritime transport problems existing in domestic, intended to analyze
from the risk strategy and suggestion of supervision to put forward the
countermeasures, instead of more detailed data calculation.
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Chapter 4 Measures for the Problems

4.1 Laws on Radioactive Substances Maritime Transportation

4.1.1 International Laws

INF Code represents that, for the transport of transnational frontiers, the Convention
has been set up prior informed consent procedure. As the parties of the country of
departure should take appropriate steps to ensure that the transportation across the
national boundaries is approval and only has prior noticed the country of arrived and
gets the approval. On the other hand, in SOLAS and INF, the vessels loading INF
goods must comply with the regulations, have been inspected and get the INF
document of compliance. Additionally, in IMDG Code, every substance which
specific activity is higher than 70 kBq/kg should be declared as radioactive substance
(Martha, Anita, Catherine & Inigo, 2007).

4.1.2 Domestic Laws

―Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China‖ clearly stipulates
that ships or facilities when storage, loading, unloading or transporting dangerous
goods, must have safe reliable equipments and conditions, complying with the
provisions of the controlling dangerous goods; If the vessels want to load or unload
dangerous goods, they must go through the procedures for declaration to the
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competent authority, to get the approval (MTSL, 2005). ―Regulations for the
Waterway Dangerous Goods Transport‖ is the earliest rule about radioactive
dangerous goods in domestic but it is out of date for its publishing in 1996. Fortunately,
its revised draft is seeking comments to improve it and many of it is refer to IMDG
Code, which sets Class 7 radioactive dangerous goods as First Class dangerous goods
(Regulations for WDGT, 2014). The requirements of package, transport, container and
so on are following IMDG Code. So, in this part, domestic laws are nearly the same as
international laws (Wang X, 2012).

4.2 The Requirements of Radioactive Maritime Transport

Whether in the international conventions or the domestic regulations, the maritime
transport of radioactive material shall meet the following conditions.

4.2.1 Document of Compliance

When the vessel wants to carry the radioactive substances, it must get the document of
compliance with the certification including Class 7. If there is no allowance in the
document as the different types of ships in Figure 3, 4 and 5, the radioactive
substances could not be transported. At the same time, according to the prior informed
consent process described above, the radioactive substance transported should have
been agreed before entering Chinese boundaries (INF Code, 2004).
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Figure 3 - Document of Compliance for China inland river ship

Source: (Baidu Picture, 2015a)
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Figure 4 - Document of Compliance for China Coastal ship

Source: (Baidu Picture, 2015b)
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Figure 5 - Document of Compliance for International ship

Source: (Baidu Picture, 2015c)

4.2.2 Packaging Requirements

In 3.41 of ―Regulation for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material‖, it sets that
Transport Index (TI) is also a specific number to control radioactive rating of the
package, outer packing, cargo, no packaging low specific activity Class Ⅰ or Class Ⅰ
surface contamination object. So, the packaging requirements in IMDG Code are as
followings:
Package Class Ⅰ： TI≈0；
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Package Class Ⅱ：0＜TI＜1；
Package Class Ⅲ ：TI≥1

The symbol of Package Class Ⅰ is white, when Package Class Ⅱ and Package Class
Ⅲ is yellow and indicates its TI (IMDG Code, 2014).

4.2.3 Dose Certification

In 7.1.14.5, Chapter 2 of IMDG Code, it shows that the radiation level of any point
outside the vehicle could not exceed 2 mSv/h, and the radiation level which is 2 m
away from the surface shall not exceed 0.1mSv/h. When the radioactive substances are
declared, the dose certification of the radiation level must be send to competent
authority.

4.2.4 Stowage

According to IMDG Code, the vessels could be divided into two groups in order to
make appropriate recommendations of the stowage, except the Class 1 explosives:
(1) Cargo ship, refers to the specialized ship which are used for carrying goods,
and the passenger ships which passengers are limited not exceeding 25 or each of the 3
m ship length does not exceed 1 passenger (take the larger);
(2) Passenger ship, refers to the ship used for the carriage of passengers and their
baggage, including the other ships in which passengers are more than 25.
(Tian, 2014)

Therefore, for the safety shipping, the stowage could be divided into 5 stowage
category. The different stowage requirements for each stowage category in different
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ships are shown in Table 4 and Figure 6. Most kinds of dangerous goods shall be
stowed in accordance with List of Dangerous Goods of IMDG and the radioactive
kinds should be stowed under the 14 Radioactive Material Lists of IMDG (PP
7101-7113). All of the radioactive kinds are Stowage Type A with some specific
conditions.
Table 4 - Dangerous goods stowage category
Stowage Stowage
Ship

Stowage

Stowage

Stowage

Stowage

Type A

Type B

Type C

Type D

Type E

Deck or

Deck or

Deck

Deck

Deck or

inboard

inboard

only

only

inboard

Deck or

Deck

Deck

Not

Not

inboard

only

only

allowed

allowed

Cargo ship

Passenger ship
Source: (Xu & Tian, 2011)

Figure 6 - Ways of Stowage in Deck
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Source: (Xu & Tian, 2011)

Moreover, according to the rules above, the radioactive substances should be stowed
as follows,
(1) The cargo should be stowed firmly to prevent damaged packaging by the
movement.
(2) When the radioactive substances are transported with other goods, the TI
should be limited.
Inboard or specific area: when loading packages or small containers TI≤ 50;
When loading large containers TI≤ 200. When the package is transporting itself, the TI
is not limited.
In the whole ship: when loading packages or small containers TI≤ 200; When
loading large containers TI is not limited.
(3) The limit value of the critical safety index CSI for fissionable radioactive
material is also by situation.
Inboard or specific area: when loading packages or small containers CSI ≤ 50.
In the whole ship: when loading packages or small containers CSI ≤ 200; When
loading large containers TI is not limit but in the stowage and segregation, each group
CSI ≤ 100 and the distance between each group is at least 6m.
(4) When TI is higher than 10 and CSI is higher than 50, this package or the
container should be transported itself without other goods.
(5) The transport facilities and equipment frequently used for transport of
radioactive substances need to be examined regularly to determine the level of
pollution.
(6) In the process of the radioactive material transportation, any pollution whose
degree is more than limit value in the equipment or part of it, should be eliminated by
competent personnel as quickly as possible.
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(Shao, 2008)

Additionally, more requirements are needed relate to the rules of MSA,
(1) Except the transportation in special arrangement, mixing of different kinds of
radioactive substances (including fissile material) and transport index of packages are
allowed without specialized competent authority approval. When the transportation is
in special arrangement, the mix is not permitted until the special arrangement is
expressly authorized.
(2) The stowage arrangements including the fissile material package control
should be decided in advance in the whole voyage or the midway stop.
(MTSL, 2005)
4.2.5 Segregation

Except the segregation of Class 1 Explosives, IMDG has divided the segregation of
dangerous goods into 4 segregate levels, as follows:

Figure 7 - Away from

Source: (IMDG Code, 2014)
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Figure 8 - Separate from

Source: (IMDG Code, 2014)

Figure 9 - Separated by a complete compartment or hold from

Source: (IMDG Code, 2014)
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Figure 10 - Separated longitudinally by an intervening complete compartment or
hold from

Source: (IMDG Code, 2014)

Table 5 - The General Provisions for Segregation between the various Classes of
Dangerous Goods

Source: (IMDG Code, 2014)
Annotations:
X - Substance specific requirements as shown in the Dangerous Goods List of the
IMDG Code
1 - "Away from"
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2 - "Separated from"
3 - "Separated by a complete compartment or hold from"
4 - "Separated longitudinally by an intervening complete compartment or hold from"
* - See 7.2.7.2 of the IMDG Code

And, the segregation about radioactive substances also include the followings,
(1) The packages, containers and tank in Class Ⅰ white symbol or Class Ⅱ、Ⅲ
yellow symbol should separate with the living area and working area except the
special room for radioactive goods with approval, attention on the radiation protection.
(2) The packages, containers and tank in Class Ⅱ、Ⅲ yellow symbol should
separate with people and no printing film.
(3) The distance of segregation is decided by the TI of the package, containers
and tank. So, if there is a plan to load radioactive substances in midway, the
segregation should be considered in the initial stowage (Wonham, Davies,
Asimakopoulos, & Tselentis, 2000).

4.2.6 Shipper's Obligations and Responsibilities

Due to the complexity and danger of the radioactive material transportation,
radioactive material transportation is different from general dangerous goods, which
may lead to some difficult problems in specific situation for the carriers. So, the
shipper should be responsible for the nuclear material and radiation, to ensure the
safety during the transportation. ―Regulations for the Waterway Dangerous Goods
Transport‖ also stipulates that the shipper or the bailor should submit the transport
statement of radioactive substances and the certificate of radiation level inspection of
the packaging radioactive substances to the carrier and harbor operator. Moreover, In
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case of container transportation, the certificate of dangerous goods shall be filled out in
accordance with the requirements as Figure 11.

Figure 11 - Container Packing Certificate for Dangerous Cargo

Source: (Baidu Picture, 2015b)
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4.2.7 Attention for Loading and Unloading

Because of the different kinds of radioactive substances and packaging types, all the
crews who are engaged in the shipment of radioactive substances, should do the
loading and unloading operation under the shipping documents and consignment
vouchers, such as cargo radioactive examination certificate of radioactivity and dose,
which are suitable to the protection requirements. When doing that, trucks and
carrying tools are good helpers. On the other hand, impacting, shouldering, bearing,
rolling or sitting on the package is forbidden. The goods with low levels of radiation,
should be placed around the high level radiation one. ―Regulations for the Waterway
Dangerous Goods Transport‖ also stipulates when loading and unloading radioactive
substances, the loader-unloader shall reduce 25% of the rated load, making sure that
the radioactive substances are ―last load first unload‖ (Zucchetti, Di Pace, El-Guebaly,
Han, Kolbasov, Massaut, 2013).

4.3 The Supervision of Maritime Radioactive Substances Transport by MSA

4.3.1 Supervision

Marine dangerous goods transportation supervision is comprehensive and complex. In
WordNet, a lexical database for English, ―supervise‖ means ―keep tabs on; keep an eye
on; keep under surveillance‖ (WordNet, 2015). Likely, in XinHuaCiDian, the Chinese
most famous dictionary, ―supervise‖ means ―control and manage‖ (XinHuaCiDian,
2015). Thus, the supervision of maritime dangerous goods transport is that the
competent authorities limit and restrict the maritime transportation of dangerous goods
under the regulations. In China, the competent authority is China MSA. Maritime
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supervision is maritime administrator to assure the safety of maritime traffic and
prevent the ocean pollution of the environment, to ensure the safety of navigation and
other administrative activities in accordance with the laws or rules. Through the basic
definition, the maritime dangerous goods supervision could be known as follows,
(1) Establish the corresponding security control system. No matter import or
export, the dangerous goods ship should make the declaration and get the approval,
and to accept the ship safety inspection and port state control made by MSA.
(2) Ship dynamic monitoring. In order to maintain the navigation order, the cruise
supervision is needed; to provide security information service, the VTS should focus
on the key ship following its tracking; to guarantee the safety navigation, the position
report system of ship should be send to MSA on time; when necessary, in the sensitive
area, the ship carrying flammable, explosive, strong pollution, or highly toxic
chemicals, could be taken security escort measures (Jiang, 2008).
(3) Build a safety management system. Shipping companies which have the
business about dangerous chemicals, should be required to establish a safety
management system, strict in accordance with the provisions of the maritime traffic
safety laws and regulations.
(4) Establish an emergency response system. ―Marine oil spill emergency plan‖
should be made based on the different regions, ports and ships; establish a
demonstration project equipped with a considerable number of facilities and
equipment; the establishment of emergency response system could help to efficiently
control the accidents and reduce the loss in a short period of time when ship pollution
accidents occurred (Mao, 2008).
(5) In the supervision of the dangerous goods, the specific characteristics of the
radioactive goods should be a focus. Especially the supervision on ship or near the
radioactive goods, it must make good connections with the related department as
Environmental Protection Agency, General Administration of Quality Supervision,
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Inspection and Quarantine and so on. And then, firstly, the officer who tries to
supervise should make good preparations as to wear the radiation protection clothing,
working cap and protective glove, to ensure the officer's own safety. Secondly, before
entering the cargo, ventilation is needed that is very important. Thirdly, the inspection
items should include the situation of mixed loading of other dangerous goods, the
space exists, the distance away from the living areas, compliance with loaded directly,
unload straight, not stored in the harbor, whether in accordance with the declaration
submitted documents (Ma & Cao, 2015). Lastly, when the supervision is completed or
leaves the place where the radioactive material is located, it is time to clean the scene
and carry out the personal hygiene treatment. The protective clothing which is subject
to the radioactive pollution shall be cleaned separately.

However, the supervision elements include: Under the condition of ensuring the own
safety, confirm the qualification of the container cargo packaging, confirm the
radiation dose of the goods, confirm how the cargo loading and unloading comply with
statutory requirements, etc.

4.3.2 The Declaration and Approval

When the shipper or the agencies are making the declaration of the Class 7 radioactive
dangerous goods, they must provide the materials as follows,
(1) The Certification of Goods. According to the requirements of the SOLAS
Convention and the IMDG Code, the shipper or the agency must submit the certificate
to indicate the Class 7 radioactive hazardous goods for its specific name, weight,
IMDG Code number, confirmation of the danger of the goods and its transport
requirements and confirmation before entering China’s borders by the relevant
departments (SOLAS 1974, 2012c).
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(2) The document of Compliance. According to the requirements of the IMDG
Code and its annex, the document of compliance could confirm whether the vessel is
able to carry Class 7 radioactive substance, whether there are special requirements
about Class 7 in this vessel, whether they have the INF certificate and so on.
(3) The Certificate of Package. In accordance with the ―Regulations for the
Waterway Dangerous Goods Transport‖ and IMDG Code, the package of the Class7
maritime transport have to use the ―Industrial Grade 1‖ packaging at least with the
specific conditions in China.
(4) The Certificate of Dose. As the description above, the dose should meet the
requirement that the radiation level of any point outside the vehicle could not exceed 2
mSv/h, and the radiation level which is 2 m away from the surface shall not exceed
0.1mSv/h. The declaration should prove that the radiation level is under these
requirements.
(5) The Stowage and Segregation. As the description above, the stowage and
segregation should be suitable to the specific Class 7 radioactive substances to prevent
leaking accident or others.

4.3.3 The Equipment for Detecting Radiation

To detect the radioactive substances, it is the detection of the presence of alpha, beta,
and gamma ray. Therefore the basic function of the equipments for detecting radiation
is to detect the exits of radiation and the intensity, to ensure the safety of the work
places and the staff, or to provide the data for preventing radiation. So, in the overall
design, the equipments should be simple, reliable, low power consumption, practical,
multi-function, multi-purpose, operability, maintainability, intelligence and so on
(Zhang, Jin, Wang & Bai, 2004). When detecting the radiation, there are two points
needed to be clear. First, only when the radiation rays pass through its containers,
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boxes of vehicles, the radioactive substances can be detected. If the radioactive
substances only emit alpha, low energy beta or low energy gamma rays, these
radioactive substances are not easy to be detected. When the radiation source is in very
good block, it will also not be detected. Secondly, not all the instruments can detect
every type of the ray. It must be based on the transport ways of radioactive substances,
and then select the appropriate instrument (Wu & Wang, 2010). In nowadays, the
apparatus for the detection can be divided into three types: pocket type instrument,
hand-held instrument and stationary instrument.
(1)Pocket type instrument: low false alarm rate, high detection sensitivity, to
distinguish different types of radiation alarm as Figure 12.

Figure 12 - Pocket Type Instrument

Source: (Zhang, Jin, Wang & Bai, 2004)
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(2)Hand-held instrument: many types of inspections, including local radiation
leakage and nuclear radiation pollution, screening artificial radionuclide, to
distinguish between natural and artificial radionuclide, as Figure 13.

Figure 13 - Hand-held Instrument

Source: (Wu & Wang, 2010)
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(3)Stationary instrument: to locate the radioactive sources, wide coverage, to
detect the radiation intensity from medical to industrial use, as Figure 14.

Figure 14 - Stationary instrument

Source: (Wu & Wang, 2010)

At the entrance to the loading and unloading freight yard, the fixed automatically
detect and alarm instrument can be used. When in the ship inspection, for the large
area regional situations, or want to locate the radioactive substances, the pocket one or
hand-held probe alarm instrument is the good choice. If there is field identification, it
is required for a portable gamma spectrometer.

4.4 The Brief Summary

50

To sum up, in this chapter, in view of the problems in the radioactive substances
maritime transport, MSA should pay more attention and take more measures to
supervise the special dangerous goods, such as to check the certification, ensure the
dose, confirm the stowage and segregation ea al. On the other hand, MSA should keep
security control for these special ships, monitoring their dynamic situation, making
emergency plan with harbor and ship company to prevent radioactive leaking accident,
more cooperation with other relative departments to confirm the safety loading and
unloading. According to the supervision and measures, as the Dayawan Power Plant
mentioned before, if the Dayawan Power Plant want to start its maritime radioactive
substances transport, how could it do? Firstly, besides the NAC-STC container (Jiang,
2005), when trying to transport in small container ship with other goods, it must make
sure that TI ≤50. The highest radiation level at any point of its surface is less than 2
mSv/h. The package is B (U) type or Industrial Grade 1 with Class Ⅲ yellow symbol.
Furthermore, Container Packing Certificate for Dangerous Goods, Document of
Compliance, Certification of Goods, Dose and Package are all in readiness. And well
radioactive proof is made. That would be a much safe transport.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion

The implication of Japan's Fukushima nuclear leakage accident is far-reaching. In
view of the large number nuclear energy applications, the safety of radioactive
substances transport should be seriously careful. In the past years, marine radioactive
substances transport has been safe and orderly, but the international states keep making
research on how to further regulate the transport to improve maritime safety, and
China are also doing more and more projects to follow the international steps. The
supervision and management of these transports are professional and important,
because any negligence can lead to catastrophic consequences. Therefore, the safety
of the maritime transportation of radioactive substances should be paid more
attention.

This paper first introduces the current situation of radioactive transport of dangerous
goods, with the definition of the classification of dangerous goods, further definition
and classification of radioactive dangerous goods in the Recommendation, IMDG rule,
SOLAS Convention and Chinese relevant laws and regulations. The next step is to
discuss the PSA mode, to make a research whether PSA model is suitable for the
analysis of dangerous radioactive Chinese maritime transport of goods. Due to the lack
of reference data samples, this risk analysis is not the best choice, but it still can tell the
problems existing in Chinese maritime transport of radioactive dangerous goods,
including the lack of supervision on the basis, not enough measures of supervision, not
clear document of compliance, the radiation dose and packaging requirements are not
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detailed enough, also lack port equipment for emergency. And maritime supervision is
a government administrative behavior, the maritime administrator as a window of
government service, it should follow the social demand, promote the development of
shipping industry, providing services to meet the public demand, pay more attention to
the impact of relevant laws and regulations. With the development of science and
technology, radioactive substances in daily life is in application more and more, which
can be foreseen that the maritime transport of radioactive materials will be more and
more frequently. Because of the specialty of the Class 7 radioactive substances,
maritime transport must be under strict control, especially the transport program,
loading and unloading condition, the packing requirements, maritime supervision and
port inspection. It will become one of the most important matters in the future on
maritime traffic safety supervision. Therefore, it is very necessary to strengthen the
supervision on maritime transportation of radioactive dangerous goods.

This paper discusses and analyzes the transportation risk of radioactive dangerous
goods, concludes the problems, proposes countermeasures, and wishes to put forward
to the supervision of radioactive dangerous goods.
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